Journal of Religion and Theatre

Vol. 2, No. 1, Fall 2003

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[page 119] The shamanist theory

The ritual thesis was not dismissed despite the heavy criticism aimed at the CSA. Contrary to expectations, while obsolete arguments were replaced by alternative ones, the main thesis remained firm. Ernest T. Kirby suggested a ritual theory on the grounds of development of theatre from the ecstatic nature of shamanist ritual.(33) From the viewpoint of the creation of the theatre medium, it would appear that Kirby's approach is advantageous. Whereas the CSA focused on shared narrative elements of ritual and dramatic fictional world, Kirby focused on a performer exhibiting an identity other than his own, apparently characteristic of both the shaman in a state of trance and the actor on stage. This alleged common property would appear to be more promising, since enacting characters is essential to acting in all dramatic media.

The term "shaman", of Siberian origin and originally employed in Siberian ethnography, is applied nowadays in the study of different cultures to a variety of medicine men who combine healing, magic and mediumship. The common belief is that the shaman is capable of entering a state of trance, travelling to other worlds, taking control of spirits and compelling them to cure people in the human world. The success of the shaman is measured by his mastery of the upper-worlds and, in this sense, it is a kind of (magic) ritual.

In the state of trance the shaman behaves as if possessed by a spirit, speaking in his voice. The belief is that in order to reveal itself within the human world the spirit is in need of the material body of the shaman. In this sense, he is a medium of this spiritual power. This quality is essential to Kirby's theory, because the shaman is supposed to "enact" an entity other than himself, a denizen of another world; and this is assumed to establish him as the prototype of the [page 120] theatre actor.

Despite its wide appeal, this approach is nevertheless fallacious, since it overlooks the internal viewpoint of the culture within which the shaman performs. The mere thought that the shaman is simply "acting" implies that magical means are not effective and cannot influence the world, in particular its ruling powers. From this internal perspective the shaman is definitely not enacting the character of a spirit, but constitutes a means for its revelation in the human world; i.e., the spirit is not conceived as a fictional entity, but as a real one. He is not describing a spirit, but becomes inhabited by the spirit itself. The shaman performs a ritual macro-act whose purpose is to change a state of affairs in the human world with the assistance of super-natural powers. The shaman believes that he is capable of coercing spirits to speak through his mouth and that he can serve as a medium for them, and so does the community. The spirit is assumed to eventually control the shaman and from this moment on its behavior is his own. The efficacy of the ritual is supposed to depend on these beliefs. If the shaman is suspected of impersonation by the community, his performance is conceived as fraud and the efficacy of the ritual is impaired.

In contrast, an actor genuinely enacts a (fictional) character. By means of performing verbal and non-verbal images, which he imprints on his own body, he creates a text, a description of a character, which reaches existence only in the imagination of the spectator. Throughout his performance on stage he consistently preserves the duality actor/character, which cannot be cancelled without becoming something else. The audience accepts the basic convention of theatre that an actor enacts a character, displaying indexes of action that reflects, not on himself but on the enacted other. Therefore, the nature of his performance cannot be perceived as fraud, but as essential to his art. Whereas the shaman's performance can be conceived in terms of "honest" or "fraudulent", the actors' performance can not.

[page 121] Even if we do not accept the internal viewpoint of the shamanist believer, and prefer a skeptical scientific approach, the principles of representation do not change. For example, from a psychoanalytical viewpoint, the thesis is that in a situation of trance the shaman reflects potential entities and voices suppressed in his own unconscious. In this sense, from this viewpoint too, he does not enact an "other", but expresses the "other" suppressed in his own soul; he enacts nothing, because this "other" enjoys real existence. Thus trance is assumed to only reflect the non-I of the shaman himself. Consequently, whether the approach to shamanism is internal or external is immaterial: in any case the "other" is conceived as real. In contrast, in creating images on stage, for the sake of describing a character, the theatre actor may draw inspiration from the contents of his own psyche, including suppressed ones, but he cannot transcend the boundaries of his medium: he does not express a character, but describes it. Moreover, an actor can describe the character of a shaman, or even a spirit, but the shaman cannot describe or even express an actor.

The problem resides in conceiving ecstasy as a condition of theatre acting. Even in the state of extreme identification with a character, the basic duality actor/character is not and can not be abolished. Furthermore, at most, this type of identification can be conceived as a quality of a particular acting style. Indeed, Kirby's approach definitely recalls the naturalistic style, in the vein of Stanislavski, which presupposes that the actor has to get under the skin of his character, as if he were possessed by it. Obviously, this is a metaphorical way of speaking, since, being figments of the imagination, fictional characters have no real skin: their fictional "existence" is conjured up by the very fact of being enacted. Moreover, it is very difficult to imagine and believe that every evening an actor enters a kind of state of trance. This assumption does not suit even naturalism, which is quite a marginal style in the history of theatre. Possession cannot be a necessary condition for theatre acting.

[page 122] Although the shaman's activity focuses on the cure of an individual patient, the ritual act takes place within a community of believers and inside a well-delimited space, such as a building or enclosed open space. From an external viewpoint, therefore, the impression is that in the state of trance, the shaman "performs" in front of an "audience" in a "theatre". Accordingly, the transition from ritual to theatre is supposed to happen when the belief in the shaman's capability to dominate the spirits weakens and/or the involvement of the community in the ritual act decreases, even if they still respect his art. It is indeed possible that in such a process of decline, shamans mobilize all kinds of gimmicks, what Kirby terms "para-theatrical" acts, for intensifying the effect of their performances. Under such conditions, the community of believers is supposed to gradually change into an audience, while the functional element of the ritual gradually disappears.(34) In this sense, this theory is not different from that of the CSA, with the creation of theatre being conceived as the outcome of a process of disintegration of a certain kind of ritual. The question is, therefore, whether or not in the state of deterioration a ritual still preserves its nature, so that it can be said that it generates the art of theatre? This is probably a necessary assumption for any theory of ritual origin of theatre, since it needs a phase in which ritual loses its essential characteristics in order to assume new ones.

Furthermore, in its correct functioning, the ritual community does not participate in the shamanist act in the same way as in a theatre performance. It forms a community of believers on whose faith the efficacy of the ritual act depends. In general, there is "participation" in both shamanist ritual and theatre, but its meaning is completely different in each of these domains. In ritual "participation" means involvement in the communal effort to change a state of affairs on a divine level for the sake of a patient's cure. In the theatre, in contrast, it means involvement [page 123] in sharing a communal form of thinking, and experiencing the potentialities of the human nature.

In his attempt to devise a unitary theory, and in order to assimilate the tradition of theatre originating in pagan Dionysiac ritual, Kirby suggested that the latter was also a particular form of shamanism.(35) Although the ecstatic character of Dionysiac faith supported this thesis, the main features of shamanism were missing in it.

In conclusion, Kirby's effortful theoretical attempt infused new life into the basic thesis of the CSA, by merely changing the line of argumentation. The crucial difference between them resides in the addition of the performative element, which transforms Kirby's approach into a genuine theory of creation of the theatre medium. However, as we have shown, this theory too does not stand up to criticism. If this is true, it is indeed a matter of wonder why it still continues to enjoy extreme popularity among contemporary theatre scholars.

Performance theory

A sense of crisis with regard to the validity of the ritual theories of origin probably underlies Richard Schechner's theoretical move, inspired by Victor Turner's anthropological approach. Schechner claims that there is no generative link between ritual and theatre, because these are different reflections of the very same kind of human activity: "performance". This activity is characterised by the combination of two main elements, "entertainment" and "efficacy", which in varying proportions create the continuum of all kinds of performance. This combination cannot be separated, and even in the extremes of the continuum no single element [page 124] exists in its purity; i.e., there is no absolute entertainment or absolute efficacy.(36) When the element of entertainment outbalances the other, the result is what is usually called "theatre"; and when the element of efficacy outbalances the other - it is "ritual". Furthermore, the proportions between these two elements can be changed at will, according to the intention of the performer. The implication is that, in contrast to previous theories, the transition from one extreme to the other is not unidirectional: just as theatre can change into ritual, so too can ritual change into theatre. In Schechner's view, theatre - or what he terms "aesthetic theatre" - achieved its peaks during periods in which the proportion between these two elements was balanced.(37) The novelty in his approach resides in that, in contrast to the stiff categories of "ritual" and "theatre" that characterize the theories of ritual origin, he suggests the single comprehensive and dynamic category of "performance".

It is this comprehensive notion of "performance", which includes disparate activities such as ritual, football, concerts and theatre, that compel Schechner to discuss the relationship between two essentially different elements such as "entertainment" and "efficacy". He defines "performance" as "an activity done by an individual or group in the presence of and for the benefit of another individual or group."(38) This over-abstract definition bears witness to the problematic nature of this concept, because it creates an artificial set with such a wide common denominator that it can include almost any human activity. Moreover, it is composed of activities so different from each other that its efficacious application is impaired. While the category of "performance" stands in contrast to "work", another comprehensive category, and would appear to apply to any kind of non-instrumental activity, it excludes artistic activities [page 125] akin to theatre, which are not performed in front of another individual or group (spectators), such as painting, making films and writing fiction (with the latter describing similar fictional worlds). Furthermore, this definition of "performance" excludes non-artistic kinds of activity, whose affinity to theatre is clear and amply demonstrated, such as imaginative children's play or day-dreaming; and includes activities without any connection to theatre, such as the efforts of a fire brigade to rescue people from a burning building, performed before of a group of curious bystanders, for the sake of the potential victims. One could go to extremes and claim that even ritual is excluded from this definition, since the participation of the community constitutes an integral part of the activity of the shaman, as part of the collective effort for the benefit of the patient, and not for those watching the performance.

No less important is to understand how Schechner characterizes "entertainment" and "efficacy". For "entertainment" he suggests the following elements: fun, only for those there, emphasis now, performer knows what s/he's doing, audience watches, audience appreciates, criticism flourishes and individual creativity. For "efficacy" he suggests: results, link to an absent other, symbolic time, performer possessed, in trance, audience participates, audience believes, criticism discouraged, collective creativity.(39) Close examination reveals that most of these reiterate the antinomies traditionally employed for distinguishing between theatre and ritual. For example, on the level of audience: "watching" vs. "participation", or "appreciation" (or critical attitude) vs. "belief"; and on the level of creativity: "awareness" vs, "trance" and "individual creativity" vs. "collective creativity".(39) The validity of these antinomies is doubtful, because they presuppose that ritual and theatre are activities in the same sphere. Schechner's main innovation resides in the distinction between "fun" (a synonym of "entertainment") and [page 126] "results" (a synonym of "efficacy"); but this antinomy is invalid too, because it creates a contrast between a kind of audience response (delight) and a kind of effect in the divine sphere - the "absent other", which is an addressee additional to those of a community of participants and a theatre audience.

Instead of Schechner solving the problem of the relationship between ritual and theatre, questions multiply. For example, does virutally pure "entertainment" exhaust the nature of aesthetic theatre? Is theatricality enhanced the more it reaches the pole of "entertainment"? Does the category of "entertainment" apply to all dramatic genres? What about subversive kinds of theatre, whose main aim is to baffle and even shock audiences? In fact, by means of the category of "entertainment" Schechner restricts a medium, which can serve any purpose, including contrasting ones, to a single purpose; and reduces its functional ability as a system of collective thinking and experiencing. Moreover, as mentioned above, even at the theatre end of the alleged continuum the element of efficacy is not totally absent. Therefore, we may ask, what is the link to the "absent other" in a play such as Molière's Les Fourberies de Scapin? And the opposite question: whom does the shaman (in his genuine act) entertain and by what means? Is he entertaining the believers participating in the ritual or the patient? The same difficulty arises with the notion of "efficacy": although it can be applied to both ritual and theatre, the meaning will be different in each of these domains. Whereas the efficacy of the shaman refers to the sphere of the spirits (the "absent other") or the cure of the patient, the efficacy of the actor refers to his ability to portray the fictional world and arouse an expected cognitive and affective response in the audience. These are not the only questions.

In understanding the notion of "performance" the term "actual" is of paramount importance. Schechner claims that all kinds of performance are "actuals". The intention is that [page 127] what is performed does not represent anything, but is identical with itself, it is here and now; i.e., it is self-referential. In this sense, the term "actual" contrasts the term "mimetic" (and, to be more accurate, "iconic"). It would appear that an activity that involves representation and an activity that avoids it exclude each other. In fact, Schechner too concedes that even aesthetic theatre maintains both the representing function of theatre and its actual character. When considered from the viewpoint of performance the "actual" aspects are: audience gathering (before the performance); performing (anything that calls the audience's attention to the mechanism of performing the stage text, in particular the actor as performing a description of a character); and audience dispersing (after the performance). The implication is that the existence of an element of representation does not contradict "actuality", and that these can be complementary to each other and a matter of perspective. Schechner's contention is also problematic because all known kinds of ritual employ systems of representation, mainly natural language. In principle, therefore, their use of a theatre medium is also possible. I believe, as I have suggested elsewhere, that we should use the category of "actual" for some kinds of art (which do not use a system of representation), including some kinds of what is now called "performance art".(40) However, although the "actual" elements of theatre can be discerned, it is not those that define this art. The cancellation of the principles of theatre representation would transform the performance into something else.

Consistent with his own approach, Schechner suggests instead of mimetic acting, which is closer in nature to the ritual pole of the continuum, the possibility of "transformational" acting:

[page 128] Modern western theatre is mimetic. Traditional theater, and again I include the avant-garde in this category, is transformational, creating and incarnating in a theater place what cannot take place anywhere else. Just as a farm is a field where edible foods are grown, so a theater is a place where transformations of time, place, and persons (human and nonhuman) are accomplished.(41)

Transformations in theater occur in three different places, and at three different levels: 1) in the drama, that is, in the story; 2) in the performers whose special task it is to undergo a temporary rearrangement of their body/mind, what I call a 'transportation' [...]; 3) in the audience where changes may either be temporary (entertainment) or permanent (ritual).(42)

I suggest that if the principle of theatre representation is involved, the so-called "transformational acting" cannot count as a kind of acting. An actor performs a description of a character, mainly by means of iconic (and conventional) signs, which he imprints on his own body, in the capacity of material that enables communication of mental images. Without the actor's body, as a medium, the spectators could not perceive these images because of their immaterial nature. Moreover, this descriptive text, imprinted on the actor's body, refers to a character, a fictional entity. In the absence of a system of representation a performer in front of an audience refers only to himself; i.e., he is self referential; he is only an actual. In contrast, an actor refers both to a character and to himself (as a producer of a theatre text, as a person whose profession is being an actor); i.e., he refers also to himself. This duality characterizes "aesthetic theatre" in general and is never overlooked by the audience. Applause at the end of a theatre performance offers clear evidence to this: the audience (unless naïve) does not applaud the [page 129] characters, but the quality of the actors' performance.

With regard to the nature of participation, following his own two-directional model, Schechner claims that the transition from theatre to ritual takes place when a group of distinct individuals changes into a community of participants.(43) This claim reflects inversely the claim of the CSA on the transition from ritual to theatre. As suggested above, the problem is that "participation" also characterizes all kinds of theatre, while its nature essentially differs from ritual participation. Whereas in ritual participation is a condition for the success of the ritual act, in theatre the audience participates in a process of collective thinking in the concrete terms of the stage. Among other things, in the capacity of medium, theatre can describe a community of participant believers, either in their success or frustration, something that is precluded in ritual. Consequently, since it is a question of participation on different levels, the transition from one kind to another is precluded.

Schechner acknowledges the affinity of its own theory to that of the CSA, despite the latter's theoretical failure. In particular, he mentions its profound influence on the modern (and one should add post-modern) theatre practice and on the manner dramatic works of millennia are now re-considered, especially ancient Greek drama.(44) In principle, he also accepts elements from the shamanist theory, particularly its conception of the shaman as the prototype of the performer, including the actor.(45) Nonetheless, in contrast to his own declarations of allegiance, Schechner makes a crucial theoretical move that essentially negates both schools altogether: "I am not going to replace the Cambridge origin theory with my own. Origin theories are [page 130] irrelevant to understanding theater. "[...]there is no reason to hunt for 'origins' or 'derivations'."(46) Schechner's theory thus constitutes a deadly blow to all ritual theories of theatre origin, because, if ritual and theatre are essentially the same, being two expressions of the same combination of elements, no relationship of derivation or generation can exist between them. Schechner's approach reflects the need for an alternative theory. The problem is that he attempts to solve the issue by eliminating the excellent distinction between "ritual" and "theatre", and suggesting the alternative, feeble distinction between "entertainment" and "efficacy", which conforms with neither intuition nor experience. Moreover, in Schechner view (aesthetic) theatre cannot avoid including elements that mainly characterize ritual; therefore, instead of their relationship being diachronic it becomes synchronic; i.e., because ritual and theatre can reflect in different proportions the very same elements, these actually coexist.

In my view, the persistent willingness to see theatre as reflecting the existence of elements that also characterize ritual, despite harsh criticism, is puzzling, to say the least. The question to be asked, therefore, is what is the charm in linking theatre to ritual? Obviously, there is nothing that can be learned about the origin of the theatre medium from all the theories that presuppose such a link; in particular Schechner's theory, since he denies the question itself. However, one can at least perceive his awareness of the inadequacy of all theories of ritual origin, especially their methodological approaches, which also underlie his own theory of relationship between ritual and theatre.

 
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Dr. Eli Rozik is professor of theatre studies. Twice head of the Department of Theatre Studies and until recently Dean of the Faculty of the Arts at Tel Aviv University. He specializes in theatre theory, particularly in non-verbal communication in performance analysis. He published many scientific articles in international leading journals, in Europe and the USA, and four books: Metaphor in Theatre and Poetry (1981 - Hebrew), The Language of the Theatre (1991), Elements of Play Analysis (1992 - Hebrew) and The Roots of Theatre (2000). Prof. Rozik was the editor of the international journal Assaph - Studies in the Theatre.